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Abstract
The variation of a martingale pk0 = p0, . . . , pk of probabilities on a
finite (or countable) set X is denoted V (pk0) and defined by V (p
k
0) =
E
(∑k
t=1 ‖pt − pt−1‖1
)
. It is shown that V (pk0) ≤
√
2kH(p0), where
H(p) is the entropy functionH(p) = −∑x p(x) log p(x) and log stands
for the natural logarithm. Therefore, if d is the number of elements of
X, then V (pk0) ≤
√
2k log d. It is shown that the order of magnitude
of the bound
√
2k log d is tight for d ≤ 2k: there is C > 0 such
that for every k and d ≤ 2k there is a martingale pk0 = p0, . . . , pk of
probabilities on a set X with d elements, and with variation V (pk0) ≥
C
√
2k log d. An application of the first result to game theory is that
the difference between vk and limk vk, where vk is the value of the
k-stage repeated game with incomplete information on one side with
d states, is bounded by ‖G‖
√
2k−1 log d (where ‖G‖ is the maximal
absolute value of a stage payoff). Furthermore, it is shown that the
order of magnitude of this game theory bound is tight.
Keywords: Maximal martingale variation; posteriors variation; re-
peated games with incomplete information
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1 Introduction
Bounds on the variation of a martingale of probabilities are useful in the the-
ory of repeated games with incomplete information. Such martingales arise as
sequences of an uninformed player’s posteriors pk0 = p0, . . . , pk of an unknown
game parameter. The martingale’s variation, V (pk0) := E
∑k
t=1 ‖pt − pt−1‖1,
bounds from above (a positive constant times) the payoff advantage that the
more informed player has over the less informed one in a two-person zero-
sum k-stage repeated game with incomplete information on one side; see
[1, 3, 4, 5].
The maximal variation of a martingale pk0 of probabilities over a finite set
depends both on the initial probability p = p0, and on k. It is bounded by
a positive constant C(p) times the square root of k. This inequality is used
in Aumann and Maschler [1]1 to prove that the speed of convergence of the
minmax value vk of the k-repeated game with incomplete information on one
side and perfect monitoring is O(1/
√
k). Zamir [5] proved the tightness of
this bound: there is a repeated game with incomplete information on one
side and perfect monitoring for which the error term, vk − lim vk, is greater
than or equal to 1/
√
k.
Mertens and Zamir [3] showed that C(p) is less than or equal to
√
d− 1 ,
where d is the number of elements in the support of p, and the error term is
less than or equal to ‖G‖√d− 1 /√k , where ‖G‖ is the the maximal absolute
value of a payoff in one of the possible d single-stage games.
The objective of the present paper is to improve the order of magnitude
of the term
√
d in the above-mentioned bounds. The main result of the
paper is that V (pk0) ≤
√
2kH(p) ≤ √2k log d, where H is the entropy func-
tion. This inequality implies that the error term is less than or equal to
‖G‖
√
2H(p) /
√
k , which is less than or equal to ‖G‖√2 log d /√k .
We also provide tightness results for both the variation of a martingale
of probabilities and the error term in repeated games with incomplete in-
formation on one side: there exists a positive constant C such that for all
positive integers k and d with 1 < d ≤ 2k there is (1) a martingale of prob-
1This book is based on reports by Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler which
appeared in the sixties in Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
See “Game theoretic aspects of gradual disarmament” (1966, ST–80, Chapter V, pp. V1–
V55), “Repeated games with incomplete information: a survey of recent results” (1967,
ST–116, Chapter III, pp. 287–403), and “Repeated games with incomplete information:
the zero-sum extensive case” (1968, ST–143, Chapter III, pp. 37–116).
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abilities on a finite set with d elements pk0 : p0, . . . , pk with variation greater
than C
√
k log d , and (2) a repeated game with incomplete information on
one side with an error term that is greater than C‖G‖√log d /√k .
2 The results
Let X be a finite (or countable) set. For x ∈ X , the x-th coordinate of
an element q ∈ RX is denoted q(x), and ℓ1(X) is the (Banach) space of all
elements q ∈ RX with∑x∈X |q(x)| <∞. Obviously, if X is a finite set, then
ℓ1(X) equals R
X . The ℓ1 norm of q ∈ ℓ1(X) is ‖q‖1 :=
∑
x∈X |q(x)|, and
(thus) the ℓ1 distance between two elements p, q ∈ ℓ1(X) is the sum ‖p −
q‖1 =
∑
x∈X |p(x)− q(x)|. A k-step ℓ1(X)-valued martingale is a stochastic
process pk0 = p0, . . . , pk where pt, 0 ≤ t ≤ k, takes values in ℓ1(X) and
E(pt | p0, . . . , pt−1) = pt−1. Let ∆(X) denote all probabilities on X , i.e.,
all elements p ∈ RX+ with
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1, and for p ∈ ∆(X) and a positive
integer k we denote byMk(X, p) the set of all martingales pk0 with pt ∈ ∆(X)
and p0 = p.
The variation of the martingale pk0 is denoted V (p
k
0) and is defined by
V (pk0) = E
(∑k
t=1 ‖pt − pt−1‖1
)
. Set
V (k, p) := sup{V (pk0) : pk0 ∈Mk(X, p)} (1)
and
V (k, d) := sup{V (k, p) : p ∈ ∆(X) and |X| = d}. (2)
A trivial inequality is V (k, p) ≤ 2k. A classical bound (that is used in the
theory of repeated games with incomplete information; see [1, 3]) of V (k, d)
is
V (k, d) ≤
√
k(d− 1).
This classical bound improves the trivial bound only for d ≤ 4k. Our objec-
tive is to derive a meaningful bound that (1) is applicable also to d > 4k,
and (2) such that its order of magnitude is the best possible one for large d.
We have
Theorem 1
V (k, p) ≤
√
2kH(p)
and thus
V (k, d) ≤
√
2k log d ,
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where H(p) = −∑x p(x) log p(x) is the entropy function and log stands for
the natural logarithm.
As V (k, p) ≤ 2k, the results of Theorem 1 are of interest for H(p) ≤ 2k
and for d ≤ e2k. For large values of d ≤ e2k, the bound √2k log d is a
significant improvement over the classical bound
√
k(d− 1). Moreover, as
there are probabilities p over a countable set X with finite entropy, the bound√
2kH(p) is applicable independently of the size of the set X .
One may wonder if the order of magnitude of each of the bounds,
√
2k log d
and
√
2kH(p), are the best possible. For X = {0, 1} and p(α) = (α, 1−α) ∈
∆(X) we have V (k, p(α)) ≤
√
kα(1− α). As α(1 − α) = o(H(p(α))) as
α → 0+, the order of magnitude of the bound √kH(p) is not tight. The
next result demonstrates the tightness of the order of magnitude of the bound√
2k log d for large values of d.2 We have
Theorem 2 There is a positive constant C > 0 such that for every k and d
with d ≤ 2k there is pk0 ∈Mk(X, p0) with |X| = d such that
V (pk0) ≥ C
√
k log d .
Bounds of the variation of martingales of probabilities are useful in the
study of repeated games with incomplete information [1]. In a two-person
zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information on one side (henceforth,
RGII-OS) the players play repeatedly the same stage game G. However, the
game depends on a state x ∈ X known only to player 1 (P1) and x is chosen
according to a probability p ∈ ∆(X) that is commonly known. In the course
of the game player 2 (P2) may learn information about x only from past
actions of player 1.
Formally, a RGII-OS Γ is defined by a state space X , a probability p ∈
∆(X), finite sets of stage actions, I for P1 and J for P2, and for every
x ∈ X we have a two-person zero-sum I × J matrix game Gx. We write
Γ = 〈X, p, I, J, G〉, where G stands for the list of matrix games (Gx)x∈X .
2I wish to thank Benjamin Weiss for raising the question of the tightness of the factor√
log d in the bound, and demonstrating for each positive ℓ the existence of a simple
martingale of probabilities pℓ0 on a set with 2
ℓ elements and with variation ℓ. Specifically,
starting with the uniform probability, in each stage half of the non-zero probabilities (each
half equally likely) move to zero, and the other half double their probabilities. Therefore,
for each fixed α > 0 there is a positive constant 0 < C(α) (→α→0+ 0) such that for k and
d with α ≤ log2 d
k
≤ 1, V (k, d) ≥ [log2 d] ≥ C(α)
√
k log d.
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The (i, j)-th entry of Gx, denoted Gxi,j, is the payoff from P2 to P1 when in
state x the players play the action pair (i, j).
The k-stage repeated game, denoted Γk(p), or Γk for short, is played
as follows. Nature chooses x ∈ X according to the probability p. P1 is
informed of nature’s choice x, but P2 is not. At stage 1 ≤ t ≤ k, P1 chooses
it ∈ I and simultaneously P2 chooses jt ∈ J (and these choices are observed
by the players following the play in stage t). The choice of it may depend
on x, i1, j1, . . . , it−1, jt−1 (which is the information of P1 before the play at
stage t) and the choice of jt may depend on i1, j1, . . . , it−1, jt−1 (which is the
information of P2 before the play at stage t).
A pair of strategies σ of P1 and τ of P2 (together with the initial proba-
bility p) define a probability distribution P pσ,τ , or Pσ,τ for short, on the space
of plays x, i1, j1, . . . , ik, jk, and thus on the stream of payoffs gt := G
x
it,jt .
The (normalized) payoff of the k-stage repeated game is the average of the
payoffs in the k-stages of the game, namely, g¯k =
1
k
∑k
t=1 gt. The minmax
value of Γk(p) is vk(p) := maxσ minτ Eσ,τ g¯k, where Eσ,τ stands for the expec-
tation with respect to the probability P pσ,τ , the maximum is over all mixed
(or behavioral) strategies σ of P1, and the minimum is over all mixed (or
behavioral) strategies τ of P2.
For fixed components 〈X, I, J, G〉, the minmax value of the matrix game∑
x q(x)G
x is a function of q ∈ ∆(X) and is denoted u(q). The least con-
cave function on ∆(X) that is greater than or equal to u (“smallest con-
cave majorant”) is denoted cav u. Aumann and Maschler [1] proved that
vk(p) ≥ (cav u) (p) and that vk(p) converges to (cavu) (p) as k →∞ . More-
over, [1] shows that the bound of the variation of the martingale of proba-
bilities bounds the (nonnegative) difference vk(p)− (cav u) (p). Explicitly, if
‖G‖ := maxx,i,j |Gxi,j|, we have
vk(p)− (cav u) (p) ≤ ‖G‖V (k, p)/k. (3)
Inequality (3) yields on the one hand a rate of convergence of vk(p), and on
the other hand enables us to approximate the value vk(p) for a specific k and
a specific game. The classical bound of V (k, p) that is used in [1, 3] and in
subsequent works is
V (k, p) ≤ V (k, d) ≤
√
k(d− 1) .
For d > k this bound is not useful. Theorem 1 provides an effective bound
when d is subexponential in k, namely, when log d = o(k), or, more generally,
5
when H(p)/k is small. Applying the bound in Theorem 1 to the inequality
(3) implies that
vk(p)− (cav u) (p) ≤ ‖G‖
√
2 log d
k
. (4)
One may wonder if the order of magnitude of the bound in (4) is tight.
We have
Theorem 3 There is a positive constant C such that for every k and d with
d ≤ 2k there is a repeated game Γ with incomplete information on one side
with (‖G‖ > 0 and) d states such that
vk(p)− (cavu) (p) ≥ C‖G‖V (k, d)/k. (5)
3 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let pk0 be (Ht)t-adapted; that is, pt is measurable with
respect to the σ-algebraHt ⊂ Ht+1. Without loss of generality we can assume
that Ht are finite, namely, algebras. (Indeed, if pt is measurable with respect
to the σ-algebra Ht ⊂ Ht+1, one replaces Ht with an algebra H∗t ⊂ H∗t+1
such that ‖E(pt | H∗t ) − pt‖ ≤ ε/k, and replaces pt with pˆt := E(pt | H∗t )
(= E(pk | H∗t )). Note that
∑k
t=1 ‖pˆt − pˆt−1‖ + 2ε ≥
∑k
t=1 ‖pt − pt−1‖.)
In that case we can assume that: (1) P is a probability on the product
X × (×kt=0At), where At are finite sets (e.g., the atoms of the algebra Ht);
(2) (x, a0, a1, . . . , ak) is a vector of random variables having distribution P ;
and (3) pt is the conditional distribution of x given a0, . . . , at. Let Pt be the
conditional (joint) distribution of (x, at) given (a0, . . . , at−1), PtX its marginal
on X , and PtAt its marginal on At. Let PtX ⊗ PtAt denote the product
distribution on X×At, i.e., PtX ⊗PtAt(x, at) = PtX(x)PtAt(at). By Pinsker’s
inequality (see, e.g., [2, p. 300]), we have
‖Pt − PtX ⊗ PtAt‖ ≤
√
2
√
D(Pt‖PtX ⊗ PtAt) ,
where for two probabilities P and Q on a finite (or countable) set Y , ‖P −
Q‖ = ∑y |P (y) − Q(y)| and D(P‖Q) = ∑y∈Y P (y) log P (y)Q(y) (where log de-
notes the natural logarithm and 0 log 0 = 0).
Let HPt(x) := −
∑
x Pt(x) logPt(x), HPt(at), and HPt(x, at), denote the
entropy of the random variables x, at, and (x, at), where (x, at) has dis-
tribution Pt, and HPt(x | at) := HPt(x, at) − HPt(at). A straightforward
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computation yields D(Pt‖PtX ⊗ PtAt) = HPt(x)−HPt(x | at). Therefore,
‖Pt − PtX ⊗ PtAt‖ ≤
√
2
√
HPt(x)−HPt(x | at) . (6)
Note that Pt is a random variable, which is a function of a0, . . . , at−1, and
therefore, by the properties of conditional entropy, EPHPt(x) = HP (x |
a0, . . . , at−1) (where EP denotes the expectation with respect to the probabil-
ity distribution P ) and EPHPt(x | at) = HP (x | a0, . . . , at−1, at). Therefore,
EP (HPt(x)−HPt(x | at)) = HP (x | a0, . . . , at−1)−HP (x | a0, . . . , at−1, at).
As the square root is a concave function we have, by Jensen’s inequality,
EP‖Pt − PtX ⊗ PtAt‖ ≤
√
2
√
HP (x | a0, . . . , at−1)−HP (x | a0, . . . , at−1, at).
As EP (‖pt − pt−1‖ | Ht−1) equals
∑
a∈At PtAt(a)
∑
x | Pt(x,a)PtAt(a) − PtX(x)| =∑
a∈At
∑
x |Pt(x, a) − PtAt(a)PtX(x)| = ‖Pt − PtX ⊗ PtAt‖, we deduce that
EP‖pt− pt−1‖ = EP‖Pt−PtX ⊗PtAt‖ and therefore by substituting EP‖pt−
pt−1‖ for EP‖Pt − PtX ⊗ PtAt‖ we get
EP‖pt − pt−1‖ ≤
√
2
√
HP (x | a0, . . . , at−1)−HP (x | a0, . . . , at−1, at) .
As the square root is a concave function, using Jensen’s inequality and
the equality and inequality
∑k
t=1 (H(x | a0, . . . , at−1)−H(x | a0, . . . , at)) =
H(x)−H(x | a0, . . . , ak) ≤ H(x), we have
E
k∑
t=1
‖pt − pt−1‖ ≤
√
2k
√
H(x) ≤
√
2k
√
log d .
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Note that V (k, d) is monotonic increasing in d and
k, and there is a positive constant C1 > 0 such that V (k, 2) ≥ C1
√
k.
If pk10 and q
k2
0 are two martingales with total variation V1 and V2, respec-
tively, then p0 ⊗ q0, . . . , pk1 ⊗ q0 is a martingale with total variation V1 and
pk1 ⊗ q0, pk1 ⊗ q1, . . . , pk1 ⊗ qk2 is a martingale with total variation V2 and
therefore p0⊗ q0, . . . , pk1⊗ q0, pk1⊗ q1, . . . , pk1⊗ qk2 is a martingale with total
variation V1 + V2. Therefore,
V (k1, p) + V (k2, q) ≤ V (k1 + k2, p⊗ q), (7)
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from which it follows that
V (k1, d1) + V (k2, d2) ≤ V (k1 + k2, d1d2). (8)
Inequality (8) implies that if k is a multiple of ℓ we have V (k, 2ℓ) ≥
ℓV (k/ℓ, 2) ≥ ℓC1
√
k/ℓ = C1
√
kℓ. Note that for every k and 2 ≤ d ≤ 2k
there is k ≥ k1 > k/2 that is a multiple of ℓ = [log2 d] ≥ (log2 d)/2 (where
[x] is the largest integer ≤ x), and therefore V (k, d) ≥ V (k1, 2ℓ) ≥ C1
√
k1ℓ ≥
C1/2
√
k log2 d. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Given two repeated games with incomplete infor-
mation on one side, Γ1 = 〈X1, p1, I1, J1, G1〉 and Γ2 = 〈X2, p2, I2, J2, G2〉, we
define the game Γ = Γ1 ⊗ Γ2 by
Γ = 〈X = X1 ×X2, p = p1 ⊗ p2, I = I1 × I2 × {1, 2}, J = J1 × J2, G〉 ,
where for x = (x1, x2), i = (i
1, i2, b), and j = (j1, j2) ∈ J ,
Gxi,j = G
xb
ib,jb
,
whereGxb stands for the more explicit Gb,xb. Note that ‖G‖ = max(‖G1‖, ‖G2‖).
A possible helpful interpretation of Γ is that nature chooses a pair x1 ∈
X1 and x2 ∈ X2, equivalently a pair of games Gx1 and Gx2 , according to
the product probability p1 ⊗ p2. P1 is informed of the choice (Gx1 , Gx2) of
nature, but P2 is not. In each stage of the repeated game, both players select
strategies for the first and for the second game, and P1 chooses in addition
which one of the two games determines the stage payoff.
As a function of i = (i1, i2, b), for each fixed b = 1, 2, the payoff function
Gxi,j does not depend on the coordinate i
c for c 6= b. Therefore we can replace
the set I (which has 2|I1||I2| elements) of stage actions of P1 in the repeated
game Γ with the disjoint union of I1 and I2.
Note that if vbk and vk stand for the (normalized) values of the k-stage
repeated games Γb and Γ, then
vk1+k2 ≥
k1v
1
k1
+ k2v
2
k2
k1 + k2
.
Indeed, P1 can play bt = 1 in stages t = 1, . . . , k1 and bt = 2 in stages
t = k1 + 1, . . . , k1 + k2, and the first coordinates i
1
t of it follow, in stages
t = 1, . . . , k1, an optimal strategy of P1 in Γ
1
k1
(p1), and the second coordinates
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i2t of it follow, in stages t = k1 + 1, . . . , k1 + k2, an optimal strategy of P1 in
Γ2k2(p2).
For ℓ > 2 and a sequence Γ1 = 〈X1, p1, I1, J1, G1〉, . . . ,Γℓ = 〈Xℓ, pℓ, Iℓ, Jℓ, Gℓ〉
of RGII-OS, we define by induction on ℓ the game Γ = ⊗ℓb=1Γb by Γ =(⊗ℓ−1b=1Γb)⊗ Γℓ.
If vbk, respectively vk, denotes the normalized value of the k-stage repeated
game Γbk(pb), respectively Γk(⊗ℓb=1pb), and k = k1 + . . .+ kℓ, then
vk ≥
∑ℓ
b=1 kbv
b
kb
k
.
Note that a stage action of P1 in Γ is a list of stage actions i1, . . . , iℓ (with
ib ∈ Ib) and a number b (with 1 ≤ b ≤ ℓ). However, given b, the payoff
depends only on the coordinate ib of the stage actions. Therefore we can
replace the stage actions of P1 in Γ with the disjoint union of the action sets
Ib, and so with a set of size
∑
b |Ib|.
Consider the example of the RGII-OS Γz = 〈X = {0, 1}, (1/2, 1/2), I, J, G〉,
introduced by Zamir [5, Section 3]. The set of states is X = {0, 1}, and play-
ers’ action sets are I = {0, 1} for P1, and J = {0, 1} for P2. The two payoff
matrices are G0 and G1: G00,0 = 3, G
0
0,1 = −1, G10,0 = 2 = −G10,1, and
G∗i,j = −G∗1−i,j . Let vzk denote the normalized value of the k-stage repeated
game Γz. Zamir [5] shows that limn v
z
n = 0 and v
z
k ≥ C1/
√
k, where C1 > 0
is a positive constant.
Consider the RGII-OS Γ = ⊗ℓb=1Γz, and let vk denote the normalized
value of the k-stage repeated game Γ. It follows that
vk ≥ max
{∑ℓ
b=1 kbv
z
kb
k
: kb ≥ 0 and
ℓ∑
b=1
kb = k
}
,
and therefore if k is a multiple of ℓ we can take kb = k/ℓ and therefore
vk ≥ vzk/ℓ ≥ C1
√
ℓ/k .
For an arbitrary k and d ≤ 2k, there is k ≥ k1 > k/2 that is a multiple
of ℓ := [log2 d] (≥ (log2 d)/2). As P1 can play (1/2, 1/2) in the last k − k1
stages, kvk ≥ k1vk1 , and thus kvk ≥ C1
√
k1
√
ℓ. Therefore, vk ≥ C12√k
√
log d.
Finally, the existence of an optimal strategy of P2 in the infinitely re-
peated game Γz (or a direct computation of the function u(p), the minmax
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value of the game
∑
x p(x)G
x, for the game Γ) yields limn vn = 0. Note that
the stage payoffs of the RGII-OS Γ are bounded by 3 (independent of the
number of factors ℓ). Altogether, we have constructed for each k and d ≤ 2k
a repeated game Γ = 〈X, p, I, J, G〉 with |X| ≤ d, equivalently |X| = d
(|I| ≤ 2 log d) and ‖G‖ = 3, and
vk − lim
n→∞
vn ≥ C1/2
√
log d/
√
k .
This completes the proof of Theorem 3. 
4 Remarks
4.1 Comments on the proof of Theorem 1.
Our proof of Theorem 1 relies on Pinsker’s inequality, and it uses information-
theoretic tools. In fact, the information-theoretic intuition has led us to
the result and its proof. However, readers unfamiliar with the information-
theoretic concepts may find the proof obscure. The following is an alternative
derivation (which disguises the use of the information-theoretic techniques)
and uses classical martingale theory techniques. First, note that Pinsker’s
inequality implies that if Z and Y are two nonnegative random variables with
EZ = EY , then E|Z − Y | ≤ √2EZ√EZ logZ −EZ log Y . In particular, if
E(Z | Y ) = Y (e.g., when Y is the constant random variable Y = EZ), then
EZ log Y = E(E(Z log Y | Y )) = EY log Y , and therefore
E|Z−Y | ≤
√
2EZ
√
EZ logZ − EZ log Y =
√
2EZ
√
EZ logZ − EY log Y .
(9)
Inequality (9), which is equivalent to Pinsker’s inequality, can obviously be
proved directly.3 The continuation of the proof avoids the (explicit) use of
information-theoretic techniques.
It follows from (9) that if Z0, . . . , Zk is a martingale of nonnegative ran-
dom variables, then
k∑
t=1
|Zt − Zt−1| ≤
√
2EZ0
k∑
t=1
√
EZtlogZt − EZt−1 logZt−1,
3 I wish to thank Stanislaw Kwapien for suggesting a proof that avoids the information-
theoretic techniques, and communicating a simple analytical proof of the above displayed
version of Pinsker’s inequality.
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which by Jensen’s inequality, the concavity of the square root, and the tele-
scopic feature of the series EZt logZt − EZt−1 logZt−1, is
≤
√
2kEZ0
√
EZklogZk − EZ0 logZ0.
Therefore, if p0, . . . , pk is a martingale with values in R
X
+ we have
k∑
t=1
E‖pt − pt−1‖1 ≤
∑
x∈X
√
2kEp0(x)
√
Epk(x) log pk(x)− Ep0(x) log p0(x).
By the Schwartz inequality we obtain that
k∑
t=1
E‖pt−pt−1‖ ≤
√
2kE
∑
x∈X
p0(x)
√
E
∑
x∈X
(pk(x) log pk(x)− p0(x) log p0(x)) .
If pk(x) ≤ M(x), then by the convexity of q log q we have Epk(x) log pk(x) ≤
Ep0(x) logM(x), and then
k∑
t=1
E‖pt − pt−1‖1 ≤
√
2kE
∑
x∈X
p0(x)
√∑
x∈X
−Ep0(x) log(p0(x)/M(x)) .
If pk(x) ≤ 1, then pk(x) log pk(x) ≤ 0, and therefore
k∑
t=1
E‖pt − pt−1‖1 ≤
√
2kE
∑
x∈X
p0(x)
√∑
x∈X
−Ep0(x) log p0(x) .
We conclude that if
∑
x p0(x) = 1, then
∑k
t=1E‖pt−pt−1‖1 ≤
√
2k
√
EH(p0).
4.2 The variation of a martingale of probabilities over
a countable set.
It is of interest to find a necessary and sufficient condition for a distribution
p on a countable set X for supk
1√
k
V (k, p) < ∞. We remark here on the
sufficient conditions derived from the classical method and our method of
bounding the variation of martingales of probabilities.
The classical bound of the variation of a martingale pk0 is obtained by
bounding, for each fixed x ∈ X , the expectation variation E‖y(x)‖1, where
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y(x) ∈ Rk is the vector of martingale differences (p1(x)− p0(x), . . . , pk(x)−
pk−1(x)) (thus ‖y(x)‖1 =
∑k
t=1 |pt(x) − pt−1(x)|), and summing over all x ∈
X . Assuming without loss of generality that p0 is a constant p ∈ ∆(X), we
have (by the Cauchy–Schwartz inequality) ‖y(x)‖1 ≤
√
k‖y(x)‖2, and, there-
fore, by Jensen’s inequality, E‖y(x)‖1 ≤
√
k
√
E‖y(x)‖22, which by the mar-
tingale property is≤ √k√E((pk(x))2 − (p0(x))2) ≤ √k√E((pk(x))− (p0(x))2) =√
k
√
p0(x)− (p0(x))2. Therefore, if p ∈ ∆(X) and X is countable, the clas-
sical method yields that supk
1√
k
V (k, p) <∞ whenever ∑x√p(x) <∞. As
−q log q = o(√q) as q → 0+, the condition ∑x√p(x) < ∞ implies that
H(p) = −∑x p(x) log p(x) < ∞. Obviously, there are probabilities p over
a countable set X such that H(p) < ∞ but ∑x√p(x) = ∞. Therefore
our bound provides a strictly sharper sufficient condition, H(p) < ∞, for
supk
1√
k
V (k, p) < ∞, compared to the one derived by using the classical
method.
4.3 The asymptotic behavior of V (k, d).
The asymptotic behavior of V (k, d) deserves further study. [4] proves that
V (k, 2)/
√
k converges as k →∞ to
√
2
π
. It is of interest to find a correspond-
ing limit theorem for V (k, d)/
√
k log d as 2k ≥ d→∞. The above-mentioned
result of [4] together with our construction in the proof of Theorem 2 yields
that the lim inf of V (k, d)/
√
k log2 d is ≥
√
2
π
as log d
k
+ 1/d→ 0 (namely, as
log d = o(k) and d→∞).
4.4 Repeated games with incomplete information.
The proof of Theorem 3 constructs for each d ≤ 2k a RGII-OS Γ = 〈X, p, I, J, G〉
with |X| = d and vk ≥ limn vn +C
√
k−1 log d, where 0 < C = O(‖G‖), and,
in addition, |I| = O(log d) and |J | = O(d). We have not tried to minimize
the order of magnitude of the number of elements of I and J . It is however
impossible to construct such an example with bounded |I| and |J |. Indeed,
in a forthcoming note we will show that for every RGII-OS Γ = 〈X, p, I, J, G〉
we have vk ≤ limn vn + ‖G‖∗
√
2|I×J | log k
k
, where ‖G‖∗ := 2Ep(maxi,j Gxi,j −
mini,j G
x
i,j). Therefore the inequality vk ≥ limn vn + C
√
k−1 log d is possible
only if |I × J | ≥ C log d
2 log k
.
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